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Is it All or Nothing?: Samsung
Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.
VICTORIA E. THORNTON*©
In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,1 the
Supreme Court was tasked to find whether 35 U.S.C. § 289
of the Patent Act, covering remedies for infringement of a
design patent, incorporated both the distinct parts of a
protected device and also the complete, shelf-to-consumer
product ready for sale.2 In a short opinion, the Court held
that section 289 does in fact contemplate that fragments can
be the relevant “article of manufacture” for purposes of
damage allocation and therefore, the patent holder will not
in every circumstance be awarded a disgorgement of the total
profits the infringer has received as a result of selling the
complete device.3 The Court then remanded the case back to
the Federal Circuit to decide what the relevant “article of
manufacture” was for purposes of damage calculation.4
The Court reached the correct decision in this case
because it chose to focus on the specific meaning of the words
in section 289, without unduly manipulating or
overcomplicating the analysis. Moreover, the decision to
broadly construe the Patent Act was firmly rooted in
precedent; the Court wisely considered its prior rulings on
design infringement and reiterated that these decisions
formed the basis of section 289. However, despite the Court’s
direction being correct, ultimately, the decision left a lot to be
desired. The opinion neglected to provide a test concerning
* J.D. 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
© Victoria Thornton 2019.
1 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
2 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 429.
3 Id. at 436.
4 Id.
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how exactly future courts are supposed to determine the
relevant “article of manufacture,” engendering legal
uncertainty in a field that already struggles to keep pace with
burgeoning technological development.
I.

THE CASE

In 2011, Apple Inc. successfully sued Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. for infringing several patents, specifically those
related to the appearance of the iPhone device.5 Design
patents D593,087, covering the raised rim of the device,
round corners and the rectangular front; D618,677 covering
its black, rectangular front face and rounded corners; and
D604,305 covering 16 chromatic icons arranged in a grid
were all found to have been infringed.6 The jury awarded
Apple millions in damages for the infringement, which
represented the total profits Samsung had made from the
sale of these devices.7 Samsung subsequently appealed to
contest the amount of the award, stating that Apple should
not be entitled to its total profits from the sale of the
products.8 The Federal Circuit rejected this apportionment
view, subscribing to a perspective that “[t]he innards of
[petitioner’s] smartphones were not sold separately from
their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary
purchasers,” thus, concluding that Apple should be entitled
to Samsung’s entire profits.9
Therefore, the dispute before the Supreme Court
derived from a textual interpretation issue concerning the
language in section 289 of the Patent Act. The Act specifies
that patent holders shall be protected from design
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
rev'd and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
6 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 434.
9 Apple Inc., 786 D.3d 983 at 1002.
5
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infringement over “any article of manufacture for the
purposes of sale.”10 The Act furthermore, continues that the
owner of the design shall be entitled to “the extent of his [the
infringer’s] total profit.”11 At trial, Samsung argued that in
order to properly calculate damages, the focus should be
limited to the precise “article” that the design in question was
applied to, not the entire device.12 However, Apple had once
again argued that because a product like a smartphone
cannot be severed and sold separately by its parts alone, the
relevant “article” must be the entire device.13
Without getting overly technical with its analysis, the
Court relied heavily on the dictionary to clarify the statutory
language.14 In addition, the Court posited that the history
behind section 289 was predominately based off its prior
rulings that preferred severability, or the “apportionment
method” to allocate damages.15 In light of this perspective,
the Federal Circuit’s reading of the Act was considered to be
uncompromisingly narrow and inflexible.16 The Court found
that when it comes to the involvement of design patents
covering multicomponent products, the statutory language
“article of manufacture” is applicable both to fragmentary
parts of the device, as well as the body of the completed
product ready to hand over to consumers.17 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded this case for further
proceedings,18 and after seven years of going back and forth
35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012).
Id.
12 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 434.
15 See Id. (“The text resolves this case. The term ‘article of manufacture,’
as used in § 289, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a
component of that product.”).
16 Id.
17 See supra note 15.
18 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 431.
10
11
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in the courts, the parties have finally settled over the matter
for an undisclosed value.19
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Interpretations of section 289 of the Patent Act have
oscillated since its original codification. Where some courts
interpreted the statutory language in such a way to favor the
patent holder by granting full damages, others reasoned that
it should not be a windfall against the infringing
manufacturer. Section II.A discusses design infringement,
Section II.B discusses how courts once conceptualized the
way in which damages ought to be calculated and finally,
Section II.C describes the history behind the formation of
section 289.
A. Who’s Looking, and at What?
In 1871, it was imperative for the Supreme Court to clearly
define the scope of what a design patent covered. 20 In a
seminal case, Gorham Co. v. White,21 two manufactures
produced strikingly similar silverware. Both parties had
argued over how similar a design needed to be to incur an
actionable, infringing offense.22 The Court reasoned that,
notwithstanding an expert’s keen eye, an infringement only
occurs when lay consumers are unable to distinguish one
brand from the other.23 Specifically, “that if, in the eye of an
Stephen Nellis, Apple, Samsung settle U.S. patent dispute, REUTERS,
(Jun 27, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-samsung-elec/
apple-samsung-settle-u-s-patent-dispute-idUSKBN1JN2S4.
19

Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
Gorham, 81 U.S. at 511.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 528 (“Experts, therefore, are not the persons to be deceived. Much
less than that which would be substantial identity in their eyes would be
undistinguishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary
20
21
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ordinary observer . . . the resemblance is such as to deceive
such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it
to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other.”24 Thus, the Court decided that the test should focus
upon the point of view of the consumer, rather than a
specialist trained in the relevant field.25 The reasoning
behind this conclusion was that an expert would always
discover some sort of discrepancy no matter what, as no two
items could ever be exactly alike.26 The Court explained that
“[t]here never could be piracy of a patented design, for human
ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in all its details,
exactly like another—so like that an expert could not
distinguish them.”27
Many years later, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gorham remained the standard for considering when a
design had been infringed, but the scope of the test became
more sophisticated with time. In 2008, the Federal Circuit in
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.28 dealt with a design
infringement case where the creator of a nail buffer sought to
enforce its design patent against its competitor. In
considering if there had been an infringement, the Federal
Circuit took into consideration that products sitting on the
market do not just appear on the shelves, isolated and
without any relation to all of the other similar products that
surround it.29 Rather, that the ordinary observer looking at
acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the
design has been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary
intelligence give. It is persons of the latter class who are the principal
purchasers of the articles to which designs have given novel appearances,
and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article
they supposed it to be.”).
24 Id.
25 See supra note 22.
26 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
27 Id.
28 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
29 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F. 3d at 674.
Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy
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the device amongst the “prior art,” would see what makes
this particular device special or “novel” from all of the others
enough to stand out and warrant patent protection.30
To illustrate the complexity of this standard, the court
introduced the example of a woman shopping for clothes.31 To
an unfamiliar observer, a rack of dresses might appear to
look substantially the same in design, however a familiar
shopper would be well acquainted with the signature cuts,
colors and styles relevant and popular in the “prior art” in
order to know what dresses are stolen images or just creative
variations. In particular, the Federal Circuit provided the
following example:
prior to the conception of th[e] design
there were in use and on sale very
many
similar
garments,
with
variations in design so slight as to
leave to the ordinary observer the
impression of a very general
resemblance, and we must assume
that to womankind, who are the
purchasers in the main of this class of
garment, these various coincident
forms of garments were known, and
whether such purchasers would be
deceived into taking the garments
which are alleged to infringe for a
garment of the patented design would
necessarily depend largely upon that
general knowledge.32

Therefore, rather than leaving the discussion about design
infringement to what the Gorham Court left us many years
ago in 1871, patent law incrementally evolved to address who
Id.
Id. at 674-75.
32 Id.
30
31
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exactly is looking at the product, along with other vital
considerations that must go into discerning if something has
really been infringed.
1. Apportionment Theory
Even in modern patent jurisprudence it is clear that in the
event a legitimate infringement is found, the patent holder
has the opportunity to collect damages; yet, confusion has
always persisted concerning exactly how to apply those
damages.33 While it may be simple to assign an award to
manufactures who hold a patent covering a singular device,
products, more often than not, are multifaceted—complete
with various, functioning parts. Because this process of
figuring out how to separate the “article” in these particular
cases has traditionally been so difficult, patent holders
generally were “able to recover the infringer’s profits on the
entire device, despite the fact that the design patent was
limited to a portion of the device.”34 This broad method of
applying damages often furnished a “windfall” to patent
holders.35
Yet, despite the confusion amongst courts, history
seemed to favor an “apportionment” approach, or rather,
granting patent holders damages only from the specific
component of their device that was actually infringed. A
notable example of this is seen in the Piano cases, Bush &
Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros I and II.36 In 1913, looking to
the “ordinary observer” and “prior art” standards, the district
court for the Southern District of New York found that the
defendant, a manufacturer of pianos, had infringed the
Thomas J. Daly & Katherine Quigley, Patent Infringement as Applied
in Samsung v. Apple, 40 L.A. LAW. 10 (2017).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 209 F. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1913),
rev'd, 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915).
33
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plaintiff’s designs on the outer body of their pianos.37 Though,
instead of damages being awarded just for the outer
decorative casing, the court granted damages over the entire
instrument.38 On the first appeal, the Second Circuit rejected
this conclusion and highlighted an important distinction:
“what [the] [Plaintiff] invented was a piano case, not a piano.
He received a patent for a ‘piano case’ and not for a piano, but
he has recovered the profits on 958 pianos.”39 Thus,
apparently deciding not to overcomplicate the matter, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff received an unjust
windfall. Particularly, that “[he has] been awarded the
profits on the piano proper, for which it holds no patent, when
its recovery should have been confined to the part which
alone is covered by the claim of its patent.”40 This discussion
ultimately lead to the conclusion of the dispute on the second
appeal, where the Second Circuit finally decided that “the
ends of justice are best served by apportioning, and thus
separating, profits which were derived from the investment
in infringement.”41
Bush, 209 F. at 233.
Id.
39 Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915).
40 Id. at 904.
41 Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 234 F. 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1916)
(emphasis added).
37
38
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B. Forming a Rule
As a result of fear over disproportionate applications of
patent protections for design infringements, finding a clearcut way to guard against the uncertainty has remained an
impetus for the Supreme Court to perfect an ideal test. In
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co.,42 a case about carpet designs,
the Court affirmed the finding of a design infringement, but
rejected the damage award.43 The Court had found fault with
the trial court’s calculation method of taking the amount
plaintiff would have normally profited off a typical sale of the
product with the included design, rather than just the design
itself.44 The Court reasoned that there was simply no link
between how much plaintiff typically received in the sale of
each, whole carpet, and what the design itself actually
enriched the defendant.45 Instead, the Court decided that
patent holders must provide proof that the profits the
infringer received derived “due to” the design and not any
other part or attribute.46 In addition, the Court in Dobson v.
Dornan47reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that
“plaintiff[s] must show what profits or damages are
attributable to the use of the infringing design.”48
In summary, these Dobson cases subsequently became
the foundation for damage allocation procedures and as a
result, were largely codified in section 289 of the Patent Act.49
Importantly, the decisions indicate, that early on, the Court
had made up its mind that damages should only be linked to
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 5 S. Ct. 945 (1885).
Dobson, 5 S. Ct. at 949.
44 Id. at 947.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Dobson v. Dornan, 6 S. Ct. 946 (1886).
48 Id. at 949.
49 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433 (2016).
42
43
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what was actually taken or infringed, and to not default to
the total value of the product sold to consumers.
C. Post-Dobson
However, despite the Court’s efforts in trying to provide a
clear standard for damage allotment, the application of the
interpretation still remained a complex and muddied issue
nonetheless. The debate that persisted remained very
technical; primarily hinging on whether the statutory
language, “article of manufacture” could also incorporate an
interpretation that meant just an aspect of the larger,
complete whole of a multicomponent product for sale.
For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,50 the Court
again reasoned that the statutory language ought to be
interpreted broadly so to incorporate the intricate parts of a
machine rather subscribing to a narrower method.51 In
addition, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in Application of Zahn,52 further clarified and
provided more structure to the interpretation, finding that “a
design for an article of manufacture may be embodied in less
than all” of the entire product for sale.53 However, there were
also many instances where it appeared as though courts
pushed back against this interpretation, or manipulated how
this rule ought to be applied.54 In Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores,
Inc.,55 the Federal Circuit stated that
“apportionment” where “the patentee was required to show
what portion of the infringer's profit, or of his own lost profit,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S.
303, 308 (1980)).
52 Application of Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
53 Id. at 267.
54 See Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir.
1980), Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 476, 495 (D.Minn.
1980).
55 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30
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was due to the design and what portion was due to the article
itself,” was a relic of the past.56 The court reasoned that the
apportionment method “presented particularly difficult
problems of proof for design patentees” and similarly
portrayed the Dobson cases as the pinnacle of the issue.57 It
was then in 2015 that the Federal Circuit in Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. leading up to Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., used this shifting
momentum to similarly find that the apportionment process
requiring patent holders to finely sparse out which part of
their multicomponent products damages could derive from,
was overly complex and chose to render the old interpretation
obsolete.58
In addition to the confusion, Supreme Court rulings
closely reflected such back and forth movement
representative of the times as well. In 2015, the Court in
Nordock, Inc. v. Systems Inc.,59 considered the matter settled;
“reiterat[ing] that apportioning profits in the context of
design patent infringement is not appropriate.”60
Particularly in this case, since the infringed design in
question on a dock leveler was “welded” to the product and
there was no evidence presented to prove the components
were ever sold separately.61 Notably, buttressing the Court’s
decision was the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Apple to
do away with the ostensibly more complex way of damage
apportionment.62 Even still, the continuous oscillation in
what method in allocation was the correct one has yet to come
to a standstill. The Court in handling the primary case,
Nike, 138 F. 3d at 1441.
Id.
58 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
59 Nordock, Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
60 Nordock, 803 F. 3d at 1354.
61 Id. at 1355.
62 Id.
56
57
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Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., took a radical
move to again shift back its opinion of how section 289 should
apply, using the original Dobson cases that originally
inspired the statute.63
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit in its refusal to reduce the
damages awarded to Apple based on Samsung’s sale of its
entire smartphone with the infringed design.64 In doing so,
the Court concluded that the relevant statutory language
that has long been under dispute, the “article of
manufacture,” is nothing more than an item that is either
produced in a factory or handmade by the manufacturer.65
Therefore, when the issue relates to design infringement that
happens to be applied to the more complex, multicomponent
products for sale, section 289 of the Patent Act may also cover
each distinct aspect.66 The Court’s final decision, however,
did not provide a test to precisely categorize the relevant
“article” for purposes of damage allocation.

Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 432-33 (2016).
Id.at 434.
65 Supra note 15.
66 Id.
63
64
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A. Remembering Dobson’s Rule
The Court began its analysis by teasing out the importance
of patent protections that cover design, distinguishing it from
other aspects of the product in question such as actual utility
or functionality of the device.67 Then, quoting the Act, the
Court explained that “patent protection is available for a
‘new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture.’”68 And, echoing the past, the Court explained
that “a design patent is infringed ‘if, in the eye of an ordinary
observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives,
two designs are substantially the same.’”69
The Court then highlighted that its prior decisions
were consistent with the concept of apportionment.70 Citing
the Dobson cases, the Court showed that, in suits concerning
design infringements in multicomponent products, it is
customary to “construe[] the statute to require proof that the
profits were ‘due to’ the design rather than other aspects of
the carpets.”71 Furthermore, it clarified that these prior
decisions provided the guiding framework that was more or
less the basis for the Patent Act currently under such intense
debate and confusion.72 Specifically, that it was “in response
to the Dobson cases [that] Congress enacted a specific
damages remedy for design patent infringement.”73
Moreover, section 289 requires that if an infringement
is found, the infringer must be liable to the patent holder for
the “extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.”74 Here,
the Court became very technical with the actual meaning of
Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433.
Id. at 432.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 432-33.
71 Id. at 433.
72 Id.
73 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433 (emphasis added).
74 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012).
67
68
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the word “total” and sought assistance from the American
Heritage Dictionary, stating that “‘total’ of course, means all
. . . the ‘total profit’ for which [section] 289 makes an infringer
liable is thus all of the profit made from the prohibited
conduct, that is, from the manufacture or sale of the ‘article
of manufacture’ to which [the patented] design or colorable
imitation has been applied.”75 Thus, beyond laying the
background information for the codification of the Act, the
Court also stressed that the language itself was simple. As a
result of this analysis, the Court reasoned that the proper
method for damage calculation necessarily involves a twostep test. Courts must “first, identify the ‘article of
manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been
applied,” and “second, calculate the infringer's total profit
made on that article of manufacture.”76
Though, “[u]nder the former interpretation” of section
289, “a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer's
total profit from the end product,”77 the Court considered that
the correct interpretation of the statute was to be much
different. The Court reasoned that the term “article” really
means nothing more than “just a particular thing” and that
“manufacture” means “the conversion of raw materials by the
hand, or by machinery, into articles suitable for the use of
man” and “the articles so made.”78 By breaking down the
statutory language this way, the Court simplified a lot of the
confusion surrounding section 289. Rather than diving deep
into how prior courts have wrestled with these terms and how
to properly apply them, the Court found that “an article of
manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or
machine” and therefore, appears to be “broad enough to
encompass both a product sold to a consumer as well as a
Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434.
Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 435.
75
76
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component of that product.”79 This point is at the heart of the
Court’s logic, and effectively deemed the Federal Circuit’s
prior holding to be too narrow of an interpretation.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme
Court held that section 289 of the Patent Act is sufficiently
broad to both encompass a sole component of a product and
also the complete product prepared for sale.80 The Court
came to the correct conclusion because it properly construed
the language of the statute by looking to each precise
meaning of the words without overcomplicating or
manipulating them. Further, the Court’s reasoning was
correct because it was practical; the holding comfortably
rested upon precedent, showing a positive regression back to
its initial findings on the issue. However, the decision is not
without its complications. In the end, Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., and its eventual settlement, left no
map or guideline to help future courts determine the precise
articles of manufacture.
A. The Supreme Court Was Right to Assert that
Design Infringements Need Not Always
Include the Finished Product
The Court was correct to interpret the statutory language
broadly. More specifically, that “the [phrase] ‘article of
manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product sold
to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold
separately or not.”81 Therefore, the lower court’s ultimate
refusal to reduce the damage award to reflect only the
amount made on the infringed design, forced a “narrow a
Id.
Id. at 434.
81 Id.at 436.
Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy
79
80
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meaning to the phrase.”82 In addition, the Court’s reasoning
makes logical sense—if investigated, a general search for the
word “article” will likely show that the term may mean a part
of a larger whole.83 Because such definition is in fact so broad,
the Court was correct in its understanding that it would be
futile to curtail its meaning to any interpretation that does
not provide for that. Rather, the Court’s decision
acknowledged that the term “article” inherently incorporates
that which may be a distinct piece of a larger whole.84
In the opinion, the Court strongly emphasized that
though “a component may be integrated into a larger
product...[that] [this] does not put it outside the category of
articles of manufacture.”85 Comparatively, this same logic
was described in the United States Amicus Brief submitted
in anticipation of this decision; almost echoing the Court’s
findings.
The court below appears to have
assumed that the relevant “article of
manufacture” is necessarily the final
product as sold in commerce. That is
incorrect. When Congress first
adopted the “total profit” standard, it
was responding to concerns raised
about a specific set of products carpets, wallpaper, and the like - that
are composed of a single component...
But nothing in section 289’s text or
history suggests that the relevant
“article of manufacture” must
invariably be the product as sold. To
the contrary, the term “article of
Id.
Definition of the word “article,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/article (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
84 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434.
85 Id. at 435.
82
83
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manufacture” literally encompasses
all
manufactured
objects—both
complete products and components—
and it has historically been
understood to include both.86

The brief, which was submitted neutrally in support of
neither party, hits upon the reality at hand; it would be
contrived and artificial to trumpet the idea that section 289’s
language only means straight-to-sale products.
Noticeably, the Court’s reasoning is not only deeply
rooted in the text, its analysis of the issues at hand are clean;
it does not seek to overcomplicate the question to be
clarified—using only a standard dictionary definition to
make a point. Moreover, as seen from the Amicus Brief, the
legal background leading up to the case, precedent and
history, all work together to firmly buttress the opinion.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision Enhanced,
Rather than Detracted From Existing Law
As detailed, not only did Congress adopt a particular
standard to provide adequate remedies for instances of
design infringement,87 the framework and basis for the
adoption was rooted in the Dobson cases and its progeny,88
all requiring the apportionment of damage awards. However,
the lower courts consistently ran back and forth, struggling
with how to remedy infringements from patent protections
covering products that only grew more advanced and
sophisticated throughout time.
The more contemporary example of this struggle may
be seen in Nordock, where the court there found that “an
Brief for the United States at 27, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777).
87 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433.
88 Id.
86
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improper methodology” was used, showing “an incorrect
understanding of the relevant article of manufacture.”89 In
denying the defendant’s plea to apportion the damages to the
infringed aspect of the product, lip and hinge plates of a dock
leveler, the court adamantly stated that the plates could not
be severed from the product. For purposes of section 289,
“total profit” can only mean “the entire profit on the sale of
the article to which the patented design is applied . . . .”90
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Samsung puts the
confusion at rest. The Court’s reasoning accurately expresses
the view that this method of interpretation is inherently
divorced to how section 289 of the Patent Act was engineered.
Specifically, the Court highlighted that Congress acted “in
response to the Dobson cases,”91 where it reasoned that the
lower court’s grant of “the entire profit...in the manufacture
and sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely
the value which the designs contributed to the carpets” was
in error and inherently misguided.92 In remanding the case,
the Court found it appropriate instead to limit damages. The
Dobson cases, only further buttress the Court’s opinion that
apportionment is the underlying method behind how section
289 should actually be applied.93
Nordock, Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
91 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433 (“In 1887, in response to the Dobson cases,
Congress enacted a specific damages remedy for design patent
infringement...The new provision made it unlawful to manufacture or sell
an article of manufacture to which a patented design or a colorable
imitation thereof had been applied. An act to amend the law relating to
patents, trademarks, and copyright. . . . It went on to make a design
patent infringer ‘liable in the amount of $250’ or ‘the total profit made by
him from the manufacture or sale . . . of the article or articles to which
the design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.’ The Patent
Act of 1952 codified this provision in § 289.”).
92 Id.
93 Id.
89
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C. Future Implications: The Ripple Effect
As mentioned, the Court’s decision to widen the scope of
section 289 was an enhancement of the pre-existing case law.
However, though the standard requiring apportionment as
set forth in the Dobson cases had already become the
preferred view of Congress, the basis for these ideals have
derived from the eighteenth century.94 Specifically, from an
era where technology did not include multicomponent
electronics devices. Since this time, the Court has wholly left
the issue undisturbed, and because of the law’s characteristic
inability to move directly in tandem with technological
advancement, courts were essentially left rudderless, forced
to navigate uncertain territories and waters. This sense of
rudderless direction is still, curiously, in place even after the
Court’s ruling on the matter.
The Court’s holding was adept, but only theoretically
so; it neglected to offer what patent applicants and reviewing
courts need to parse what the correct “article” in any given
circumstance is in practice. Without offering any sort of test,
the Court simply remanded the case and left it up to the
Federal Circuit to reconfigure Apple’s damage award.95
Looking to the future, this leaves the world of patent creation
and the subsequent litigation it inevitably produces,
uncertain.
This imbalance between theory and practice in the
technology field will likely prove detrimental. Because the
Court effectively volleyed the decision back to the Federal
Circuit to formulate its own test—offering advice that the
“article” could be only a component as well as the entire
device, it is very likely that the amount of the original
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 5 S. Ct. 945 (1885); Dobson v. Dornan,
6 S. Ct. 946 (1886).
95 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 436.
94
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damage award could have remained undisturbed.96 However,
since the Samsung case has since settled outside of court for
an undisclosed value, interested spectators determined to see
the outcomes of this case will never appreciate the real
impact.
In addition to such considerations, it appeared as
though the deliberating jury actually intended the initial
Apple award to be punitive, endeavoring to hurt Samsung.97
Reuters’ interview with the foreman on the case stated
concerning the verdict that: “[w]e wanted to make sure the
message we sent was not just a slap on the wrist...[w]e
wanted to make sure it was sufficiently high to be painful,
but not unreasonable.”98 Yet, this is clearly in error. Section
289 seeks only to make the patent holder whole once more;
the statutory language does not contemplate punitive
measure. In summary, despite the Court’s meticulous review
of the American Dictionary and past sources to rightfully
clarify the scope of the statute,99 the new decision did not
provide any guidance concerning what procedures are
actually required.
Moreover, though the Court’s ruling was correct to
read the term “article” broadly, allowing damages for design
infringements to be apportioned to components as well as full
devices, the brief opinion may feel half-baked for creators and
patent hopefuls looking for further guidance. Samsung
released a statement concerning the matter, stating that the
original award was not necessarily “a win for Apple, but a
Id. (“We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages
inquiry. . . . Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in
this case, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on
remand.”).
97 Infra note 97.
98 Dan Levine, Jury Didn't Want to Let Samsung off Easy in Apple Trial:
Foreman, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/us-applesamsung-juror/jury-didnt-want-to-let-samsung-off-easy-in-apple-trialforeman-idINBRE87O09U20120825.
99 See supra note 74.
96
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loss for the American consumer,” meaning that the award
“will lead to fewer choices, less innovation, and potentially
higher prices.”100 Moreover, the opinion may have left open a
gap for the risk of stagnation in creative innovation to
flourish. Written in a separate statement, Samsung stated:
[I]nnovation will be stymied by fear of
litigation and the loss of all profits
should a product be found to infringe
any design patent—no matter how
insignificant. For example, with their
design patent for a front screen with
rounded corners, Apple received all of
Samsung’s profits from the sale of its
phones. Such a ruling discourages
innovators from bringing new
products to market.101

While of course, these statements should be read with
caution of bias, the Court’s brevity and silence concerning
these important matters has inevitably left uncertainty for
subsequent patent law litigation. The rule that governs
concerning infringement cases is if the two designs are so
similar that they may be mistaken for the alleged infringed
device.102 Yet with smartphone devices mostly being released
in square shapes with square touch screen icons, the
boundaries of what ought to be viciously protected by the law
and what will inevitably stifle progress and future innovation
becomes blurred. This is a strange reality.
Christina Bonnington, What the Apple v. Samsung Verdict Means for
the Rest of Us, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/08/
what-apple-v-samsung-means/.
101 SAMSUNG NEWSROOM, Advancing a Better Future for Innovators and
Consumers, https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-advancing-a-betterfuture-for-innovators-and-consumers-scotus-apple-design-patent-law/
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
102 Supra note 22.
100
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Perhaps because of the Court’s rather bare-bones
holding, the same sense of rudderless direction has once
again befallen lower courts who now must go forth and make
decisions on how to property apply this apportionment
standard. Now that we know an article may also be a
component of a device, what then? Furthermore, even with
this necessary flexibility covering the law of design
infringement awards created as a result of the Court’s ruling,
does this change the dangers of potential juries feeling the
need to punish infringements so that the blows felt by
subsequent damage awards are “painful”?103
1. Searching for a Test
Though the Court was correct to support the more expansive
definition of “article,” the Court declined to provide a new test
or guideline to help figure out how to categorize the relevant
elements in a multicomponent device. Despite this shortfall,
the Court did explicitly cite to the Amicus Brief that was
submitted by the United States.104 In this Brief, the United
States proposed a model test that posits a case-by-case
analysis, preferring to focus on the attribute that seems most
likely to make the wronged patent holder whole once more.105
The Court was correct to effectively use this Brief in lieu of
creating an actual test because it supports the apportionment
standard view the Court trumpets, and also puts in place
something more concreate and practical for creators and
courts to use.
First, the Court’s decision that damage awards should
be apportioned to the relevant article, not necessarily the
whole device,106 is mirrored in the proposed methods in the
Amicus Brief. The Brief provides:
Supra note 97.
Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016).
105 See supra note 85.
106 See supra note 15.
103
104
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Congress did not render the infringer
liable for its total profit on the final
sold product, however, but only for its
total profit on the “article of
manufacture” to which the patented
design was wrongfully applied. In
cases where the identity of the
relevant “article of manufacture” is
otherwise open to reasonable dispute,
the factfinder may legitimately
consider
which characterization
would appropriately compensate
(rather than over-compensate) the
patentee for the contribution of the
patented design to the value of the
infringer's finished product.107

Secondly, the Court was correct to simply cite the Brief
because it had already done the lion’s share of the work in
laying out a practical factor test. Using prior Federal Circuit
precedent as support for its position, the Brief posits that
there are several factors that must be looked at. First, the
patent specification itself must suggest exactly which parts
the design are associated with the device, and how that
evidence is then related to the device “as a whole.”108 Second,
the factfinder must weigh the “prominence” or importance of
the design to the device; if the design is “conceptually
distinct” from the complete device and lastly, the factfinder
must consider the “physical relationship between the
patented design and the rest of the product,” meaning, if the
component in question may be physically removed and sold
separately from the rest of the product.109
Brief for the United States at 27, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777).
108 Id. at 28.
109 Id.
107
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The Court, in citing this Brief thus effectively provided
a way for later courts to properly define the appropriate
standard concerning how to apportion damages for design
infringement cases. In the long run, because the actual
opinion leaves so many questions unanswered, creators
seeking to secure a patent over a multicomponent product
would likely be best served by seeking design patents over
not just the entire device for sale, but also provide coverage
over its distinct parts to ensure their inventions will be
adequately protected and to avoid any potential unreliability
in the application of the apportionment measure.110
CONCLUSION
In hindsight, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc. did
what was necessary in undoing what had gone wrong. Rather
than provide a loophole for patent holders to receive a
windfall in case of an infringement, section 289 should be
understood more broadly to curtail this adverse result. This
should be done under the language of the statute, while at
the same time still endeavor to honor and adequately protect
patent holders’ creations. Further, what is clear from the
Court’s decision and the history that has led up to it is that
damage allocation must also be executed in a particular way
in order to guard creative expansion in the technology sector
and to provide a free space for manufactures to engineer a
new and innovative product for consumer sale. Keeping these
factors in mind, the Court’s decision in the matter pushes the
conversation on the right track.
Thomas J. Daly & Katherine Quigley, Patent Infringement as Applied
in Samsung v. Apple, 40 L.A. LAW. 10, 12 (2017).
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